The Sierra Leone Bar Association v Attorney General & Minister of Justice & Another (SC 2 of 2002) [2004] SLSC 1 (30 January 2004)


 

                            SIERRALII SUPREME COURT BULLETIN

                      COURT: SUPREME COURT OF SIERRA LEONE

CORAM:

The Hon. Justice A. B. Timbo – C. J.

Hon. Mr. Justice S. C. E. Warne – J.S.C.

Hon. Mr. Justice E. C. Thompson-Davis – J.S.C.

Hon. Mr. Justice M. O. Adophy – J.S.C.

Hon. Mr. Justice V. A. D. Wright – J.S.C.

SC. 2/2002

BETWEEN

THE SIERRA LEONE BAR ASSOCIATION

AND

  1. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE – 1ST DEFENDANT
  2. EKE AHMED HALLOWAY – 2ND DEFENDANT.

REPRESENTATION

Mr. Berthan Macaulay Jnr. for Plaintiff

Mr. L. M. Farmah for 1st Defendant

Dr. A. Renner-Thomas for 2nd Defendant

JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON THE 30TH DAY OF JANUARY 2004

TIMBO, C.J.

Facts

On or about the 27th of May 2002 it was announced on Radio 98.1 that the 2nd defendant had been nominated by His Excellency the President to the office of Attorney-General and Minister of Justice. The 2nd defendant then entered upon the duties of his office without the approval of parliament.

The plaintiff submitted that the legality of the appointment of the 2nd defendant needs to be determined as his appointment was made without prior approval of parliament.

It was based on these facts that the plaintiff by an originating motion sought declarations pursuant to sections 122, 124 (1) (a), and 127 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone (No 6 of 1991) –

The interpretation of sections 56, 57, 58, 59, 60(1) and 64(1) and 2 of the constitution.

Issues

  1. Whether the appointment of the 2nd defendant in sections 64(1) and (2) was subjected to section 56(2) of the constitution, and the effect of such appointment without the approval of parliament?
  2. Whether sections 56 (2) – (5) are applicable to the office of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice referred to in sections 64(1) and (2) of the constitution?

Findings and Analysis

  1. In determining the first issue the court reasoned that the phrase in section 56 (2) (b) “nomination for appointment” means two different things and they should not be used interchangeably.

Thus, the person nominated for appointment must be approved by parliament before the designation of the position will take effect.  However, there is nowhere in the constitution that stipulates that section 64(1) is to be construed with sections 56(1) and (2). Sections 64(1) and (2) should not be subjected to section 56(2)(b). Hence, the office of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice does not fall within the purview of 56(2)(b).

  1. In determining the second issue the court reasoned that when parliament deemed it necessary for parliamentary approval for certain public offices it has stated it expressly. If they intended that the office of the Attorney-General should be subjected to parliamentary approval, they should not have created a separate subsection for it.

Thus, section 56 (2) – (5) of the constitution is not applicable to the office of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice referred to in sections 64(1) and (2) irrespective of the fact that they take the same oath of office as the other Ministers of Government under section 56.

Decision of the Court

In consideration of the facts, the court refused the declarations sought by the plaintiff. It held that the office of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice is not subjected to the approval of parliament.

No order was made as to cost.

 

 

 

 

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